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 
Abstract— Recently, several global navigation satellite systems 
(GNSS) emerged following the transformative technology impact 
of the first GNSS - US Global Positioning System (GPS). The 
power level of GNSS signals as measured at the earth’s surface is 
below the noise floor and is consequently vulnerable against 
interference. Spoofers are smart GNSS-like interferers, which 
mislead the receivers into generating false position and time 
information. While many spoofing mitigation techniques exist, 
spoofers are continually evolving, producing a cycle of new 
spoofing attacks and counter-measures against them. Thus, 
upgradability of receivers becomes an important advantage for 
maintaining their immunity against spoofing. Software-defined 
radio (SDR) implementations of a GPS receiver address such 
flexibility but are challenged by demanding computational 
requirements of both GNSS signal processing and spoofing 
mitigation. Therefore, this paper reviews reported SDRs in the 
context of instrumentation capabilities for both conventional and 
spoofing mitigation modes. This separation is necessitated by 
significantly increased computational loads when in spoofing 
domain. This is demonstrated by a case study budget analysis. 
 
Index Terms—Global Positioning System (GPS), global 
navigation satellite systems (GNSS), software-defined radio 
(SDR), interference mitigation, instrumentation review. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
HE success of the US Global Position System (GPS) 
promoted broader deployment of other global navigation 
satellite systems (GNSS) as well for providing position, 
velocity and time (PVT) information for users in civil, 
commercial and military applications [1], [2]. After GPS 
became available to commercial and civil markets, many 
components of critical infrastructure and broadly used 
applications started relying on the continuous availability of 
PVT information. Today, a sudden shutdown of GNSS would 
have a tremendous impact on systems relying on them for 
navigation or timing. Examples of GNSS-reliant ecosystems 
include conventional and emerging autonomous transportation 
[3], cellular networks [4], and even regulation and measurement 
of phasors in power systems [5], [6]. 
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 With so many existing and new markets depend on GPS, it is 
essential for GPS receivers to withstand interference, 
intentional or otherwise. GPS signals can experience 
unintentional interference from other radio frequency (RF) 
emitters or intentional interference due to jamming or spoofing 
attacks. Spoofers are intelligent jammers that transmit specific 
counterfeit GNSS-like signals to force the receiver to compute 
erroneous positioning and timing [7], [8]. 
There have been many techniques developed to deal with 
both intentional and unintentional interference over the years. 
In particular, arrays of antennas are effective in validating 
known direction-of-arrivals (DOA) of satellite signals at the 
expense of increasing receiver cost and size [9]-[11], which is 
undesirable for mass-market applications. There exist many 
single antenna techniques as well, such as [7], [8], [12]-[16]. 
Nevertheless, spoofing techniques continuously evolve, and 
there are no universal mitigation techniques that address all 
current and future threats. In that light, upgradability of the 
GNSS receivers becomes an important issue to support current 
functionality for best achievable overall performance and 
protection against spoofing attacks. Conventional GNSS 
receivers rely heavily on hardware (HW) components due to 
intense computational requirements and are not flexible for 
essential upgrades. Emerging software-defined radio (SDR) 
solutions implement most of the critical operations in software 
(SW) mode and are highly flexible for upgradability. The 
flexibility introduced by SDRs also makes it preferred research 
and development instrumentation for fast prototyping and 
testing of new receiver architectures and algorithms. 
Still, state-of-the-art SDR solutions do not match 
computational power of HW-based receivers [17], [18], and 
often do not support real-time operations. For acceleration, 
SDRs often employ field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) 
[19]-[27], digital signal processors (DSPs) [28]-[31] or are fully 
implemented in SW on a host PC [32]-[54]. Of the mentioned 
SDR GNSS receivers, only a few address interference 
mitigation techniques. 
Protection against spoofing attacks requires significant 
additional computational resources, which are not guaranteed 
by reported general-purpose solutions. With an existing 
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considerable research spectrum related to the general field of 
GNSS SDRs [43], [45], [55], [56], the specific domain of 
spoofing mitigation in the context of instrumentation 
capabilities is not systematically reviewed to the best of the 
authors’ knowledge, and this paper addresses this existing gap. 
Therefore, this paper, first, contributes a general-to-specific 
SDR review through the lens of interference mitigation and 
instrumentation budgeting. It includes: (1) an overall GNSS 
receiver classification, (2) reported performance of SDRs for 
this application, and (3) a demonstration of a significant surge 
in complexity between conventional GNSS and advanced 
mitigation operational modes by using a case study receiver and 
a cross-correlation mitigation algorithm. 
Section II presents a state-of-the-art overview of general 
domain GNSS-SDR solutions. Section III examines reported 
SDR applications for spoofing mitigation domain in terms of 
instrumentation capabilities. Section IV presents a case study 
receiver computational budget of common operations. Section 
V presents a reduced complexity minimum mean squared error 
(MMSE) technique proposed in [12], which is used as a case 
study integrated with a receiver previously developed by the 
authors. Section VI examines aforementioned MMSE 
implementation in a fast prototyping real-time SDR testbed, 
along with a computational complexity budget analysis. Section 
VII presents simulation and performance results of mitigation 
algorithms to validate functionality. Section IX finalizes with 
concluding remarks. 
II. GNSS RECEIVER DESIGN AND OVERVIEW 
Software-defined radio emerged with a substantially 
beneficial purpose: to place the analog-to-digital converter 
(ADC) as close to the antenna front-end (FE) as possible, so 
that all samples from the ADC are post-processed in a 
reconfigurable SW mode rather than HW. This adds 
configurability, flexibility, and upgradability [55]. This trend 
has gained attention in GNSS receivers; especially and recently, 
in real-time operation capabilities. 
It was not until the last two decades that general-purpose 
processors (GPPs) have gained enough processing power to 
achieve real-time operations that previous HW application-
specific integrated circuits (ASICs) were performing, such as 
HW correlators. The main components of a GNSS receiver are 
an RF block, which consists of an active antenna, a low-noise 
amplifier, and a FE, followed by three common baseband 
blocks: acquisition, tracking, and navigation. 
Acquisition is a process of coarse synchronization of the 
received signals with locally-generated correlating replicas for 
estimating their time and frequency misalignment. For 
acquisition, recent advances use FFT-based techniques to either 
replace correlation operations in the frequency domain (carrier 
replica) or the time (code replica) domain. Other advanced 
acquisition algorithms use shared FFT techniques for joint-
space searching in both domains for even faster computations 
[57]. 
Tracking is a process of fine synchronization where 
continuous alignment of the incoming signal with so-called 
local pseudorandom (PRN) code replicas (time domain) and 
carrier replicas (frequency domain) need to be attained. This 
becomes the most challenging task in GPS SDRs since tracking 
loops conduct continuous processing of an incoming satellite 
signal by estimating carrier phase and code phase offsets for a 
stable synchronization lock. This is done for all previously 
acquired (visible) satellite signals. Code phase estimation is 
obtained by a delay-locked loop and carrier phase estimation is 
obtained by a phase-locked loop and/or a frequency-locked 
loop [32], [47], [58]. This allows for fine synchronization in 
both the time and frequency domains, resulting in successful 
despreading of the incoming GNSS signals for navigation data 
extraction. During tracking synchronization, correlator outputs 
from the delay-locked loop are grouped into unique frames to 
form navigation data and to compute pseudo-range 
measurements [32], [47], [55]. 
Finally, if navigation data is successfully collected from 
enough satellites (four is the minimum), then the tracking stage 
gathers data from all channels, aligns data in a systematic set, 
and runs navigation algorithms to solve user PVT solutions 
[47], [58]. 
GNSS-SDR receivers are designed based on the 
aforementioned baseband modules and the RF block. Authors 
in [55], [56] describe SW radio receivers with various HW/SW 
configurable components where baseband functionality (i.e., 
acquisition, tracking, and navigation) can be distributed after 
the RF block (FE sampler): reconfigurable hardware such as 
FPGAs, coprocessor units such as graphical processing units 
(GPUs), embedded specialized GPPs such as DSPs, and 
general-purpose host PCs. Authors in [55] have defined three 
architectures that divide GNSS functionality onto these 
components: Classical HW, Hybrid, and Fully SW 
architectures, based on where most of these baseband modules 
are distributed. Other authors distinguish SDR categories 
between post-processing and real-time solutions [56], based on 
SDR being real-time or not, and whether it is implemented on a 
PC or an embedded system. 
As an alternate approach, we focus on correlators as being 
the most computational consuming operation in the receiver. 
Additionally, while some authors associate FPGAs and DSPs 
as being in the same category [45], [55], other authors 
distinguish DSPs for their ease-of-use [59] and for having a 
non-HW-configurable GPP. Therefore, we categorize FPGAs 
and DSPs separately. We also isolate DSP-based GPPs from PC 
GPPs. In addition, by considering aforementioned HW/SW 
configurable components by their ease-of-use, we define a 
category similar to Fully SW, which includes an even higher-
level component recently adopted in SDR receivers: a 
prototyping software (P-SW) platform. A P-SW platform is 
defined as a high-level programming framework working atop 
the host PC operating system (OS) and has the ability to 
efficiently manage and optimize PC computational capabilities 
such as parallelism and multi-threading (MT). Such platforms 
or environments can be LabVIEW (LV), MATLAB + Simulink 
(M+S), or even open-source solutions such as GNU Radio [60] 
and Python. Many of these P-SW platforms offer ease-of-use 
and fast prototyping by means of built-in block 
implementations. We then define the following categories: (1) 
FPGA where all correlations occur, and a host PC with 
(optional) PVT solutions and pre-configurations. (2) DSPs or 
embedded GPPs, and a host PC for (optional) PVT solutions 
and/or output visualizations. (3) Host PC where most baseband 
functions are executed. Finally, (4) P-SW platform, for fast 
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prototyping. This final category is a novelty in this paper and 
offering the highest flexibility in terms of SW configurability 
and ease-of-use. We attempt to categorize currently reported 
SDR solutions in said categories as seen in Fig. 1, with optional 
hybrid approaches across. We also avoid ASIC solutions [17], 
[18] as we focus on purely SDR implementations. 
Table I summarizes current reported SDR solutions 
organized according to listed categories (1)-(4) (see Fig. 1). For 
a given receiver category (row), all receiver references falling 
into this category are listed under said section. Additionally, 
receiver category references are divided into three other 
columns: real-time capabilities, their overall SW/HW 
architecture, and leveraged factors for acceleration, if any. 
These three rightmost columns are independent of each other, 
and the acceleration factor column can repeat a receiver 
reference based on implemented acceleration techniques. 
Of all these SDR solutions, the combination of real-time and 
ease-of-use implementations are considered the most valuable 
for research. Many solutions in category (1) implement 
reconfigurable HW accelerators in correlators [19]-[27] but 
offer less flexibility and ease-of-use, as opposed to GPPs found 
in categories (2)-(4) [59]. Category (2) offers low-power 
embedded solutions such as DSP boards [28]-[31], which are 
not tailored for optimal speed. The ease-of-use of this category 
is considered intermediate to advanced since it often requires 
low-level programming such as bit-wise operations [29], [31]. 
Category (3) offers more flexible environments, as it can use 
more generic programming skills and optimized libraries in the 
form of application programming interfaces (APIs) such as fast 
Fourier transforms (FFTs), [32], [35], [38], [39], [41], [43]. 
Many accelerators in this category are C/C++-based and exploit 
multicore abilities for parallelism [59], MT [33]-[35], [38], 
[41], [43], [45], single-input multiple-data (SIMD) instructions 
[33], [34], [39]-[41], [43], [45], OpenMP APIs to schedule CPU 
multicore resources with noticeable speedups on correlators   
[38], [41], [43], [59], GPU-based APIs for parallel arithmetic 
operations [33], [34], [39]-[41], [43], real-time (RT) Linux OS  
[36], [37], [45], among others (see Table I). Category (3) can 
be associated with the Fully SW option mentioned in [55]. 
Nevertheless, category (3) receivers often require advanced 
dedicated software solutions which have evolved during many 
years and optimizations using dedicated OS platforms such as 
RT Linux [43], [44], assembler instructions [36], [38], [39], 
[44], [45], and so on. Moreover, API-based SDRs typically do 
not give access to the source code [41], thus, limiting tight 
integrations with potential research algorithms. Category (4), 
which uses a P-SW platform for fast prototyping, commonly 
offers an ease-of-use framework such as in LV-based [46], [53], 
[54], and M+S-based [50]. This property enables researchers to 
test algorithms quickly and generally requires less 
programming effort, and time, e.g., authors [51] developed a 
Python-based vector tracking multi-receiver. Nonetheless, SW 
platform-based SDRs often lack accelerators due to their ease-
of-use nature. Therefore, a scarcity of real-time receivers in said 
category proposes a challenge for ongoing research. 
Recent research has proposed accelerators for category (4) 
that offer a combination of real-time and fast prototyping [53], 
[54]. In terms of interference mitigation in the context of 
instrumentation capabilities, said SDR fits well for research 
extensions. 
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Fig. 1.  GNSS SDR categorization based on flexibility and ease-of-use. 
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TABLE I 
REPORTED GPS RECEIVERS IN SDR CATEGORIES (1)-(4) (SEE FIG. 1) 
 
SDR 
category 
Real-time 
capability 
SW/HW 
architecture 
Acceleration 
factors 
1. FPGA 
[19]-[27] 
Non-real-
time [24], 
real-time 
[19]-[23], 
both [25]-
[27] 
FPGA/DSP board 
[19]-[21], [25], GPP-
based PVT [19]-[23], 
[25]-[27], host PC 
visuals [22]-[24], 
[26] 
FPGA accelerators 
[19]-[27] 
2. DSP 
(GPP) 
[28]-[31] 
Real-time 
[28]-[31] 
DSP board [28]-[31], 
host PC visuals [28], 
[30], [31] 
DSP accelerators 
[28]-[31], bit-wise 
operations [29], 
[31] 
3. Host 
PC [32]-
[45] 
Non-real-
time [32]-
[34], real-
time [35]-
[43], both 
[44], [45] 
C++-based [32]-[35], 
[38]-[41], [43], [44] 
APIs [34], [38], [41], 
[43], [44] 
Linux OS [36], [37], 
[45] 
GPU libraries [34], 
[39], [40], [41], [43] 
GUI [38], [41], [43], 
[44], [45] 
Optimized libraries 
[32], [35], [38], 
[39], [41], [43] 
SIMD [33], [34], 
[39]-[41], [43], [45] 
MT [33]-[35], [38], 
[41], [43], [45] 
assembler [36], 
[38], [39], [44], [45] 
GPU APIs [33], 
[34], [39]-[41], [43] 
RT-Linux [36], 
[37], [45] 
bit-wise operations 
[35], [36], [41]-[43] 
OpenMP API [38], 
[41], [43] 
4. P-SW 
Platform 
[46]-[54] 
Non-real-
time [46]-
[51], both 
[52]-[54] 
MATLAB-based 
[47]-[49], M+S [50], 
LV-based [46], [53], 
[54], open-source 
[51], [52] 
FPGA accelerators 
[46], optimized 
libraries [52]-[54], 
MT [52]-[54], 
SIMD [52]-[54], P-
SW accelerators 
[46], [53], [54] 
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III. REVIEW OF GNSS SDRS FOR INTERFERENCE MITIGATION 
Introducing algorithms that address interference mitigation 
generally increase the computational complexity of the 
receiver; thus, only a few of the many existing GNSS-SDR 
approaches operate in real-time. For this reason, this section 
separates this category of receivers. Furthermore, we examine 
reported interference mitigation techniques with their 
corresponding host receivers. 
A. GNSS SDRs with interference mitigation 
Interference and spoofing of GNSS signals is a vast area of 
research. As mentioned in [7], certain signal properties of 
GNSS signals are vulnerable to and exploited by interference 
and spoofing attacks. An overview of types of interference 
attacks can be categorized into jamming and spoofing, which 
can be very similar but should be distinguished from one 
another. Some forms of jamming include narrowband or 
wideband continuous wave and RF interference (RFI) often 
called chirping signals [10], [14]. These techniques aim to make 
the receiver lose lock by transmitting overpowering signals. For 
spoofing, the attacks rely on subtlety by trying to take over the 
receiver’s current position or time, rather than blocking its 
signal altogether. One of the most common spoofing 
approaches is meaconing, which is based on relaying satellite 
signals with increased power to introduce a delay on the target 
receiver and influence PVT outputs. The reader is directed to 
[7], [8], for more relevant information on jamming and spoofing 
attacks. 
Table II presents a categorized set of SDR solutions found in 
the literature that use interference mitigation techniques based 
on mitigation types described in [8], as well as their reported 
SDR platform and real-time capability. Based on the mitigation 
categories column, authors in [8] described these four groups 
of interference mitigation: 1) signal processing-based, which 
exploit stages of a GNSS receiver on the RF chain, i.e., 
automatic gain control monitoring, as well as other common 
GPS stages such as acquisition, tracking, and/or navigation, 2) 
cryptographic-based, which attempt to provide encryption on 
GNSS signals, specifically on payload navigation data 
broadcast from the satellites for additional layers of security and 
authentication, 3) correlation with other GNSS signals, which 
utilize additional constellations, frequency bands, and/or 
sensors to monitor and detect counterfeit signals on current 
GNSS signals, and 4) radio spectrum and antenna-based, 
which exploit multiple antenna techniques, such as angle-of-
arrival (AOA), to spatially pinpoint the counterfeit signal 
sources for dissolution from authentic signals. 
Additionally, the specific technique column lists keywords 
that describe the overall method utilized for each mitigation 
category. For each overall method referenced in the specific 
technique column, an associated SDR platform is also 
referenced as the solution used, listed in the same order used in 
the specific technique column. If no SDR was reported for the 
specific technique, an N/A is used. For the real-time column, 
the reference correlates to the specific technique’s reference, 
and not the SDR platform’s reference.  
1) Signal processing-based 
For the signal processing mitigation category found in Table 
II, several authors modify a certain step of the GNSS receiver 
chain to assess and mitigate interference. Similarly, they 
employ digital signal techniques for post-processing and 
analysis. In [61], authors modified a real-time SW receiver for 
detecting the presence of spoofing based on live post-correlator 
outputs from the tracking stage of their GNSS receiver, NGene 
[45]. These correlator outputs were filtered through a Chi-
square statistic to detect anomalies. The NGene receiver 
successfully attained live spoofing detection by using two 
additional correlators per channel. Similarly, authors in [62] 
modeled correlator outputs with and without spoofing as a 
Gaussian distribution and attempted to detect spoofing by 
monitoring the model variance. Their simulations were run on 
a modified version of the GSNRx receiver [34]. Another post-
correlation application was introduced in [63], where authors 
tracked vicinity peaks of the acquisition output for possible 
spoofing signals. This technique was implemented on a real-
time open-source receiver, GNSS-SDR [52]. Authors in [64] 
evaluated the performance of wavelets for radio frequency 
interference (RFI), and notch filtering for continuous wave 
interference using recorded GPS data on their SW receiver 
platform IpexSR [38]. Vector tracking correlators reported in 
[65] rely on joint vector processing of concurrent tracking 
channels for monitoring of possible attacks and discards 
pseudo-range measurements from suspected nefarious channels 
before calculating the PVT solution. This solution used the 
aforementioned GSNRx platform in offline mode. A non-real-
time Python-based vector tracking receiver, PyGNSS [51], 
applied direct GPS positioning (DP) [66] and direct timing 
estimation (DTE) [67] techniques, which are based on a 
maximum likelihood estimator (MLE), to discern spoofed GPS 
parameters in vector processing, such as clock bias. Power 
analysis and monitoring were reported in [62] with GSNRx in 
offline mode. Finally, other signal processing techniques used 
cross-correlation properties of PRN codes in optimization 
TABLE II 
OVERVIEW OF SDR SOLUTIONS WITH INTERFERENCE MITIGATION 
TECHNIQUES DIVIDED IN CATEGORIES [8] 
 
Mitigation 
category 
Specific technique SDR 
platform 
Real-
time? 
Signal 
processing 
Post-correlators: [61], [62], 
[63] 
[45], [34], 
[52] 
[61], [63] 
wavelet + notch filter [64] [38] N/A 
vector-tracking correlators 
[65] 
[34] N/A 
MLE based on DP [66], 
and DTE [67] 
[51], [51] N/A 
Power analysis [62] [34] N/A 
MMSE + MWF [68], [69] [53], N/A [68] 
Cryptograph SCER [70], [72] [71] [72] 
Correlation 
w/ other 
GNSS 
signals 
GPS C/A and P(Y) 
correlation [73], [74], [75], 
[76], [77] 
[71], [74], 
[29], [29], 
[51] 
[73], [76] 
Radio 
spectrum and 
antenna 
Space-time correlation [79] [34]  N/A 
AOA [80], [81] [80], [71] [80] 
Antenna arrays [82], [83], 
[84], [85], [86], [87] 
N/A, [34], 
[34], [52], 
[52], [52] 
[87] 
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techniques, such as MMSE [12], [68], and multi-stage Weiner 
filtering, to separate the spoofer from authentic signals [69]. 
2) Cryptographic-based 
For cryptographic-based techniques, authors in [70] used an 
improved GRID receiver [29] with an anti-spoofing and 
defender-receiver testbed reported in [71] for cryptographic 
mitigation techniques based on security code estimation and 
replay (SCER). The attack obtained an estimate of the security 
chip used on the received encrypted signals to replay it for 
authentication. The testbed was able to detect and mitigate 
SCER attacks in offline mode by using the modified GRID 
testbed [71].  In [72], authors achieved real-time mitigation for 
up to 14 channels with said attacks. 
3) Correlation with other GNSS signals 
In correlation with other GNSS signals, authors in [73]-[77], 
proposed using the GPS L1 band, which contains both the 
civilian C/A and the encrypted military P(Y) signals in the in-
phase and quadrature, respectively. Authors correlated code 
phase and timing relations between both codes to detect 
possible spoofers. Receivers used were variations of GRID for 
[73]-[76], and PyGNSS for [77]. For most offline receivers, an 
existing Texas Spoofing Test Battery (TEXBAT) recording 
files database [78], which provide common spoofing scenarios 
for static and dynamic attacks, was used. 
4) Radio spectrum and antenna-based 
Finally, for the radio spectrum and antenna-based category, 
several techniques, such as space-time correlation introduced in 
[79], were proposed for multi-antenna testbeds. Spoofing and 
jamming signals were also detected by DOA and AOA of 
incoming satellite signals in [80]-[86]. However, the cost and 
additional equipment needed for such a receiver may not be 
suitable for all applications. Authors from [87] implemented an 
antenna array anti-spoofing testbed in their real-time GNSS-
SDR receiver [52]. 
While many SDR receivers with interference mitigation 
integration were listed in Table II, only [61], [63], [68], [70], 
[71], [73], [76], [80], [87] provided real-time mitigation 
capability. Said capability is considered state-of-the-art because 
of its increased computational complexity in spoofing domain. 
B. Interference mitigation solutions comparison 
As an attempt to narrow the aspects of instrumentation 
capabilities on previously-discussed SDRs with interference 
mitigation, in this subsection, we include four selected popular 
receivers for a more detailed analysis. Table III provides this 
summary. It also includes a receiver from previous work [53], 
[54], for a demonstration of computational complexity 
distribution of a case study interference mitigation algorithm 
(Section VI). Three of five solutions are category (4) P-SW 
platform with two being real-time: LV-based solution [53], 
[54], and GNU Radio-based solution [52]. Another real-time 
solution is category (2) DSP from Humphreys et al. GRID [29], 
[71]. Several maximum sampling rates are seen across the 
reported and cited references, ranging from 5 Msps to 25 Msps 
(see Table III). As for real-time tracking, between 1 and 22 
channels have been reported for selected solutions. When using 
22 channels, typically half are used for conventional satellite 
tracking and the other half for interference injection and 
mitigation [71]. 
1) Jafarnia-Jahromi et al. (GNSRx) 
Jafarnia-Jahromi et al. have several research papers 
concerning their GNSRx [34] receiver. They implemented 
signal processing-based interference mitigation techniques, as 
well as radio spectrum and antenna-based methods (see Table 
III). Since their SDR receiver is not real-time, a Spirent GPS 
simulator was used to generate signals for testing. The receiver 
uses a C++ modular design and uses 3 channels from a NI FE. 
They successfully implemented the receiver with 22 channels 
and sampling rates up to 25 Msps, normal and spoofed. 
In the receiver, various GNSS signal operations are divided 
into high, medium, and low rate computational categories, 
which are performed in the 4-50 MHz, 50-1000 Hz, and 20 Hz 
or less range, respectively. To make the system adaptable to 
new algorithms, a modular object-oriented approach is used. 
The Doppler removal and correlation (DRC) object, used to 
track a given satellite signal, incurs the largest computational 
burden. To improve DRC processing, SIMD instructions for 
x86 processors and a multi-threaded architecture are 
implemented. These are used as C++-based accelerators for 
faster computations. 
Additionally, an NVIDIA 8800GTX GPU is used in GSNRx 
to leverage DRC operations. The high degree of parallelism, as 
a result of the large number of available GPU threads, provides 
considerable processing improvements. GPU co-processors can 
be divided into small threads. Each thread computes the local 
code and carrier phase, Doppler removal, and local code 
multiplication for each sample it is responsible for and sums the 
result. It was shown in [34], that the average DRC processing 
time for 1ms of data on eight satellites was less than 1 ms when 
sampled at 25 Msps when using the GPU, providing a real-time 
operation, which was implemented in [40]. 
In [79], [83], [84], antenna techniques were used with GSNRx 
to achieve spoofing detection and immunity. In [79], space-time 
correlation was used and in [83], [84], an array of antennas was 
implemented to detect and mitigate spoofing attacks. In [62] 
and [65] they implemented vector tracking and power analysis 
mitigation techniques, respectively. None of these testbeds 
were reported as real-time since they used recordings from the 
Spirent simulator and used real, recorded signals to assess their 
performance. 
2) Humphreys et al. (GRID) 
Authors in [71] developed an augmented version of GRID 
[29] for real-time spoofing and detection of signals. The 
conventional GRID [29] receiver can track hundreds of GNSS 
live channels in its latest reported iteration [59], nonetheless, 
when spoofing is implemented, this computational power 
decreases. The augmented system [71] is capable of tracking up 
to 12 live authentic channels and 12 spoofed channels (see 
Table III). The proposed SDR uses a DSP, with most code 
written in C++ for upgradability. Most of the optimizations 
carried out in GRID are bit-wise parallel operations leveraged 
from the DSP’s architecture by using built-in AND, NOR and 
XOR modules. They also use look-up tables stored in memory 
for fast local carrier and code generation. Their receiver’s FE 
was able to sample at 5.714 MHz with an IF of 1.405 MHz. Its 
full range capability is a combination receiver and spoofer 
testbed, which can simultaneously generate 12 spoofer channels 
and defend them as reported in their latest SCER attack iteration 
[72]. 
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In [80], [81], authors successfully tested and implemented a 
dual-antenna receiver using GRID, which detects phase and 
AOA of authentic and potential spoofing signals. By knowing 
delta phases calculated using the known antenna location and 
their separation, the technique has shown the ability to discern 
between authentic and counterfeit signals. 
In [73]-[76] authors used GRID in a different mitigation 
approach. They implemented an additional receiver, which 
observes the military GPS P(Y) signals for possible detection 
of attacks, assuming this additional receiver signal from P(Y) is 
clean. This detection algorithm exploits the known phase-
quadrature relationship of the encrypted P(Y) code relative to 
the C/A code and other properties. Only [73] and [76] were able 
to run in real-time operation based on optimizations that were 
implemented in the receiver. 
Finally, in [70], [72], authors use cryptographic-based 
techniques for spoofing detection and mitigation. Assuming 
navigation data has a cryptographic security code associated 
with it, it is possible for the spoofer to execute a SCER attack, 
in which the spoofer attempts to estimate the security code chip 
value for each GPS signal it intends to attack. The defending 
receiver attempts to detect possible SCER attacks by means of 
hypothesis tests related to noise levels and the received signal 
power. The augmented GRID receiver performed close to real-
time for these detection techniques since a 2 ms delay was 
found on the SCER attack in [70], although [72] did report real-
time. TEXBAT [78] database was used in all non-live 
experiments for this group of authors. 
3) Gao et al. (PyGNSS) 
Authors in [51] developed an advanced receiver based on 
vector tracking of concurrent GPS channels for added 
robustness. The concept is called multi-receiver vector tracking 
(MRVT), which can be seen as multiple GPS receivers jointly 
tracked through shared receiver states and a single navigational 
filter. The navigation filter is commonly used as a modified, 
jointly-shared, extended Kalman filter, to exploit joint tracking 
techniques. The receiver is non-real-time and is mainly 
implemented in Python, an open-source interpreted language 
that lacks optimizations but is highly configurable. The receiver 
design is highly modular for fast adaptations and prototyping. 
As the states of each receiver are shared using MRVT, many 
receiver optimizations can be achieved. For example, MLE can 
be used for joint observations of clock bias and clock drift in 
the navigation solution. In [66], a DP technique based on MLE 
of raw observations on the MRVT was implemented. In [67], a 
DTE technique similar to the previous DP solution was also 
implemented using joint observations for phasor measurement 
units (PMUs) in power grids. These PMUs share a known 
location. Thus, fewer unknowns can be exploited for DTE 
techniques. In [77], a multi-layered multi-receiver architecture 
was also proposed, where shared states from the MRVT are 
used to detect spoofing across channels. Several detection tests 
were implemented based on power analysis of joint elements 
between the multi-receiver architecture. 
4) Fernandez-Prades (GNSS-SDR) 
GNSS-SDR [52] is an open-source real-time GNSS multi-
frequency receiver. The receiver uses the GNU Radio [60] 
framework as its core implementation. The receiver is highly 
configurable, but at the same time has many software 
dependencies (including GNU Radio). It is based on a Linux 
environment and can utilize many FE options, such as USRP 
units from Ettus [88], GN3S sampler [47], NSL Primo [89], and 
IFEN’s NavPort [90]. It can also work with recorded binary 
files. The architecture is based on modularity and MT, meaning 
each channel has its own independent acquisition, tracking and 
navigation thread. Once the receiver has enough channels, it can 
then compute PVT solutions. The receiver’s performance 
depends on the host PC’s computational capabilities, but still 
TABLE III  
COMPARISON TABLE FOR DIFFERENT SDR PLATFORMS ON INSTRUMENTATION CAPABILITIES FOR INTERFERENCE MITIGATION TECHNIQUES AS REPORTED 
IN INCLUDED REFERENCES 
 
Group authors 
and SDR 
Mitigation technique SDR architecture Real-
time? 
Sampling 
rate* 
Live 
channels** 
Acceleration 
factors 
Case study 
receiver [53], 
[54] 
Signal processing: MMSE 
blind detector [12], [68] 
Category (4): Host PC, 
USB FE, C++ DLL & LV 
platform. 
Yes Up to 25 Msps 
Up to 12 live 
channels** 
[68] 
SIMD, LV 
parallelizable 
loops, multi-
threading, etc. 
Jafarnia-
Jahromi et al. 
GNSRx [34] 
Antennas: space-time 
correlation [79], arrays [83], 
[84], Signal processing: vector 
tracking [65], power analysis 
[62] 
Category (3): 3 channel 
NI FE, C++ modular 
design 
N/A Up to 25 Msps 
Up to 22 total 
signals** 
SIMD, multi-
threading, GPU 
accelerators 
Humphreys et 
al. 
GRID 
[29], GRID + 
spoofer/receive
r, [71] 
Cryptography: SCER [70], 
[72], Correlation: C/A and 
P(Y) [73]-[76], Antennas: 
AOA [80], [81] 
Category (2): GPP DSP 
in C++-based 
Yes [72], 
[73], [76], 
[80] 
5.7 Msps 
Up to 14 live 
channels** 
[72] 
DSP accelerators, 
C++ bit-wise 
parallel 
operations, LUTs 
Gao et al. 
PyGNSS [51] 
Signal processing: MLE based 
on DP [66], and DTE [67], 
Correlation: multi-layer multi-
receiver [77] 
Category (4): Python-
based SDR. USRP N210 
and GN3S [47] for offline 
recordings 
N/A Up to 5 Msps N/A N/A 
Fernandez-
Prades et al. 
GNSS-SDR [52] 
Signal processing: SPREE 
[63], Antennas: [85]-[87] 
Category (4): Host PC, 
GNU Radio [60], Linux-
based, C++ open source 
Yes [63], 
[87] 
Up to 10 Msps 
[63]. 
One** [87] 
Multi-threading, 
SIMD, 
modularity, C++ 
optimized libraries 
*Maximum reported sampling rate per SDR with interference mitigation solution. 
**Includes real-time conventional and spoofed channels. 
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leverages several acceleration factors such as SIMD and vector-
based operations in Linux [52]. 
Due to their robustness, there has been considerable research 
in the use of antenna arrays for interference detection [85]-[87]. 
In these works, the authors built and implemented an 8-channel 
antenna array, and tested it using several scenarios, both during 
real-time operation using the GNSS-SDR receiver and a 
commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) GPS simulator, as well as 
with offline recordings [87]. They were able to run algorithms 
with enhanced acquisition and detection of spoofers using an 
antenna array, in real-time on a single tracking channel. 
Since the receiver is open-source, authors in [63] 
implemented real-time interference detection and mitigation on 
the same software receiver using a signal processing technique. 
They added a parallel tracking channel for the same PRN code 
to detect a second correlation peak that might be deviating from 
the main peak, thus, detecting a spoofer attempting to avert the 
receiver to an erroneous PVT solution. In this work, authors 
used TEXBAT [78] recordings for offline testing as well as 
real-time operation with GNSS-SDR. 
IV. A CASE STUDY RECEIVER BUDGETING WITHOUT 
INTERFERENCE 
Before introducing advanced mitigation techniques, a 
receiver used for the case study is explored. A LV-based GPS 
L1 single-frequency receiver reported by authors in [53], [54]. 
It implements baseband functionality in C/C++ units that have 
been compiled as dynamic link libraries (DLLs). The P-SW 
platform architecture uses several LV-based acceleration 
factors such as parallelizable loops, inherent MT, and other 
non-LV-based enhancements, such as SIMD Intrinsics from 
Intel [91] to exploit the host CPU, as seen in Fig. 2. For 
algorithm accelerators, an advanced acquisition module was 
implemented in SW based on [57]. For optimized libraries, 
FFTW [92] and Eigen [93] packages are used for FFT and 
matrix operations, respectively. LV allows FE interfacing and 
easy control based on automatic parallelization blocks that 
allow real-time operation of the receiver. Advanced 
visualizations and GUI controls were also used for real-time 
debugging and monitoring. Additional LV-based accelerations 
can be achieved via FPGA. As seen in Table III, up to 25 Msps 
can be achieved, and up to 12 live tracking and/or spoofing 
channels are attained. 
For the case study interference mitigation algorithm 
implemented, a common configuration in the receiver is used: 
sampling rate at 5 MHz, int8 data type, and I-Q interleaved 
samples. For further details on SW and HW components, as 
well as performance tests, the reader is directed to [53], [54]. 
In the following, a computational complexity budget 
breakdown of common operations is examined in the case study 
receiver. It will be followed in Section VI by a computational 
complexity budget analysis in interference mitigation mode to 
demonstrate a noticeable surge in computational load. 
To assess instrumentation capabilities of the case study 
receiver, several offline computations are benchmarked to 
obtain the aforementioned budget of common GPS baseband 
operations. These operations, although in offline mode, provide 
a very close benchmark value to real-time execution. In the 
context of host PC memory allocations and data type handling, 
previously mentioned common configurations are used for all 
budget operations. These common configuration parameters 
become relevant in terms of (linear) scalability of basic 
arithmetic operations, as well as memory allocation. 
Sample data type is also important, as it specifies the number 
of quantization bits for sample resolution [47], [58]. In GPS 
SDR solutions, 8-bit samples have been proven to be enough 
for nominal operation and good precision. Some solutions use 
even fewer bits for faster computations [41], but since P-SW 
platform SDRs use multi-purpose processors, the byte (8-bit) 
fits naturally. 
As an example, using said common configuration, a 1-ms 
block of data would consist of 10,000 bytes since each sample 
is of byte size (int8), and 1 ms of raw data collected at 5 MHz 
sampling rate consists of 5,000 samples for both the in-phase 
and quadrature interleaved components. Many FEs use 
intermediate frequency (IF) mixers, which output IF in-phase 
only samples, thus, receiving a smaller block of samples but 
also requiring an extra down conversion step to get the 
baseband I-Q sample pair. For the case study SDR, the FE uses 
a direct down-converter, thus, providing samples in baseband 
as an I-Q pair to save on extra operations. In terms of FFT 
operations, using a next power-of-two FFT size is common 
practice in SDR receivers. For 5 MHz sampling rate, the next 
FFT size would be of 8,192 for a single 1-ms epoch. For a 
sampling rate increase to 10 MHz, the numbers would scale up 
by a factor of two, and a 1-ms block would now be of size 
20,000 samples, considering previous logic. This also means 
the correlators would need to deal with twice the number of 
operations, depending on their implementation. The FFT size 
would also jump to 16,384. The number of these operations 
provide an idea of computational budget for common SDR 
operations in real-time operation. 
Fig. 2.  Software-defined GPS receiver platform accelerator factors for real-time operation.  
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Table IV shows a computational budget for the case study 
SDR. A full acquisition of a single PRN search benchmark is 
included. As mentioned previously, the acquisition operation 
executes on 4-ms integration time and a 10 KHz frequency 
search band, respectively. More on FFT sizes and the algorithm 
implemented can be seen in [46], [57]. For common tracking 
operations, conventional correlators were benchmarked, i.e., in-
phase and quadrature early, prompt, and late. This totals 6 
correlators per GPS channel. As for the discriminators, a 2nd 
order delay-lock loop and phase-lock loop, and 1st order 
frequency-lock loop were used, respectively [58]. Therefore, a 
full tracking cycle contains carrier generation and wipe-off, 6 
correlators processing and integration, and common 
computations, i.e., atan for discriminators. For a single 
correlator, all these previous operations were considered after 
the carrier wipe-off. Navigation benchmarks are not included 
since they account for minimal expenses as PVT solutions run 
at 2 Hz. 
V. CHOSEN INTERFERENCE MITIGATION ALGORITHM FOR 
RECEIVER BUDGETING 
This section expands on a modified interference mitigation 
algorithm [68], which is a computationally optimized version 
of [12]. There are many other spoofing methods, nevertheless 
and without the loss of generality, the following algorithm is 
chosen because of the noticeable computational surge (times) 
of receiver operation in mitigation mode. 
A. Background 
The overall function of a GPS receiver is to synchronize to 
satellites to obtain navigation data and extract measurements 
for range estimations. The tracking synchronization is 
performed by correlating received (spreading) signals with 
locally generated (despreading) replicas of expected satellite 
PRN codes to maintain their alignment. A GPS received signal 
is composed of a superposition of multiple satellite codes 
contaminated by channel distortions and spoofing interference. 
Conventional GPS receivers employ replica codes, which are 
the same as those sent by satellite transmitters. This ensures 
acceptable reception in outdoor areas but does not provide 
sufficient immunity against spoofing. There exist advanced 
solutions that enhance local (despreading) codes in the 
receivers to reduce these effects. De-correlators and MMSE 
detectors [94] are typically used for mitigating the multiple 
access interference effects in spread spectrum systems. 
However, the MMSE approach is computationally intensive 
due to required autocorrelation matrix inversions. To simplify 
the processing, some investigators estimate the cross-correlated 
signal and subtract it from the weak signal channel [58], [95], 
[96]. This solution is not optimal, computational overhead is 
still high, and applies only to known jamming signals. An ad-
hoc solution is suggested in [97] using an additional 
orthogonalization process for better separation of weak and 
strong channels. There, the authors observed the performance 
of their method deteriorates for various conditions of available 
stronger jammers. An optimal solution is presented in [12], 
where the authors propose an algorithm for GPS-like interferer 
mitigation. This method is further optimized computationally 
next and used as a case study for budgeting the operation 
complexity of the spoofer-mitigating SDR receiver. 
B. Mitigation algorithm description 
In the following, the signal model described in [12] is 
explored. Without loss of generality, it is assumed the GPS 
receiver is already coarsely synchronized with available GPS 
signals using an acquisition process, and each satellite signal is 
being tracked by finely aligning the received signal with a 
corresponding locally-generated replica, as conventionally 
applied in GPS receivers in nominal conditions. 
Each satellite is assigned a dedicated processing channel
{1,..., }k K . The received sampled signal for each channel, k, 
after carrier wipe-off and prior to code correlation is denoted as 
vector kr  of length N samples for one code period. This signal 
is a linear additive combination of the synchronized k-th PRN 
satellite signal 0ks of one code period length, power kp , and 
sinusoidal and code modulated signals from other 1K   visible 
satellites, plus noise. Additionally, the k-th satellite signal is 
modulated by a navigation bit-sample, kb , such that: 
 
0
k k k k k kb p  r s i n   (1) 
where ki  is the interference of other 1K   satellite signals and 
kn  is the noise. 
The receiver wipes-offs (despreads) the codes by multiplying 
to a despreading code, kh , and integrating (i.e., a correlator is 
used to associate received signal and dispreading replica). The 
decision variable kd  for the channel k  is then determined to 
be the following: 
 
T
k k kd  h r  (2) 
where kh  is a unit norm vector that does not amplify or 
attenuate the received power during a bit-sample. Each receiver 
channel minimizes its mean squared error (MSE) cost function, 
denoted as kMSE  to determine an optimal dispreading code 
[12]. The MSE for each satellite k  is as follows: 
 
2
k
k k
k
d
MSE E b
p
  
   
  
   
  (3) 
This can be interpreted as a normalized MSE in comparison 
with the definition used in [98]. Applying Karush-Kuhn-Tucker 
(KKT) conditions, the resulting optimal despreading code 
solution is given as [12]: 
 
1 0
k k k kp
h R s   (4) 
TABLE IV 
COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY BUDGET FOR CONVENTIONAL SDR 
OPERATIONS AT 5 MHZ SAMPLING RATE 
 
Operation Type Cycle time (ns) 
FFT 8,192 (1 ms) 46,547.2 
FFT 32,768 (4 ms) 399,186.2 
Full acquisition (single PRN) 5,684,375.5 
Single correlator* 1,689.03 
Full tracking epoch** 18,635.0 
*Single correlator includes code generation, mixing, and integration cycle time, for, e.g., early in-
phase. 
**Full tracking includes carrier wipe-off, 6 conventional correlators for in-phase and quadrature, 
for early, prompt and late, respectively, final integration, and discriminator output. 
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where ][
T
kkk E rrR   is the autocorrelation matrix of the 
received signal of channel k  after carrier synchronization, and 
1
kR  is its inverse or pseudoinverse for minimum norm solution 
if the matrix is singular. 
In [12], authors proposed a group-weighting method that 
could trade off complexity vs. performance in the code 
adaptation. The next subsection describes a computationally 
optimized version of this technique, as seen in [68]. 
C. Reduced complexity despreading approach 
We restrict the decoding sequence to the following format: 
   0.*k k kh w s   (5) 
     1,1 1, 2,1 2, ,1 ,, , , , , , , , ,
T
k g g M M gw w w w w w
 
 
w  
 (6) 
where  .*  is the element-by-element multiplication of the 
vectors, and 
,i jw  is the 
thj  element of the 
thi  group of size g, 
making kw  a vector of size 
N
M
g
 . As the elements of 0ks  
are 1 , then M
T
kk
T
k g 1wsh 
0
. Let us split kh , kr  and 
0
ks  into 
M  segments: 
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The constrained kh  will be then as follows: 
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Denote kj
T
kjkjc rh  as a partial correlation, and 
 TkMkkk ccc ,...,, 21c  as a vector of partial correlations. Then, 
 
T T
k k k k kd  h r w c  , and (9) 
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where ckR  is the autocorrelation of partial correlations. 
Minimization of kMSE  is achieved by applying KKT 
conditions, taking the partial derivative with respect to kw , and 
equating to zero: 
 
2
2 0Tck k k M
k
g
p
 
R w
w 1   (11) 
 
1
k k ck Mgp
w R 1   (12) 
These solutions are suboptimal for g > 1, in comparison with 
those provided by the optimal algorithm from (4). This is a 
result of the group-weighting method decreasing the freedom 
of designing dispreading code; alternatively, it has the 
advantage of significantly decreasing the computational 
complexity. Moreover, the solution presented for partial 
correlations can also be implemented with a computational 
complexity of  3O M . This solution has a computational gain, 
of order  3O g , in comparison with the conventional MMSE 
solution from (4). Fig. 3 shows the interaction of partial 
correlations kc  with input and replica samples, generating the 
optimal output sample kd . Ultimately, these M  weights, kw , 
are correlated to obtain the maximum SINR solution in decision 
variable kd , and are implemented in the tracking correlators for 
ideal navigation bit extraction. 
The quality of a GNSS receiver operation is defined by the 
accuracy of the PVT solution. The presented algorithm 
addresses pre-PVT detection and mitigation of the interference 
and falls in the signal processing-based category. It applies a 
scalable blind equalizer-like technique to sense and remove 
certain interference per channel. The performance of this is not 
based on bit recovery but on bit-error rate, as is used to assess 
its quality. 
VI. CASE STUDY RECEIVER BUDGETING WITH INTERFERENCE 
This chapter describes the implementation of the MMSE 
algorithm from Section V as an advanced correlator unit in the 
case study receiver. It further elaborates on the implementation 
as seen in [68] and addresses complexity through diverse 
optimization techniques. It describes a computational budget 
with said interference mitigation algorithm to complement the 
discussion from Section IV. 
The MMSE correlator is presented as a modification to the 
conventional GPS tracking correlator. For this implementation, 
the in-phase prompt (IP) channel is adjusted. An essential 
aspect of the MMSE algorithm is the computation of an
 
Fig. 3.  Group-weighting method partial correlation sample interaction [68]. 
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autocorrelation matrix seen in (12), which is obtained from a 
single correlator output. The autocorrelation matrix, obtained 
from the outputs of the partial correlator, serves as a blind 
sensing module for possible interferences. It senses cross-
correlation anomalies in the matrix and adjusts weights 
accordingly for interference filtering. Some options to control 
the computational complexity of these updates are the grouping 
parameter g  and window size L , which are detailed next. 
A. MMSE correlator implementation 
Fig. 4 shows the MMSE correlator as an advanced unit, 
which can be added to the existing tracking loops. Specifically, 
it modifies a traditional correlator unit so there are partial 
integrate and dump (I&D) and complete I&D filters instead of 
common I&D filters to extract samples between said filters. 
This modified MMSE correlator is used to compute, after 
carrier wipe-off, the autocorrelation matrix of partial 
correlations, ckR , corresponding to the method in (12). Using 
optimal weights, the MMSE correlator outputs an integrated 
value with filtered-out cross-correlation interference. 
Conventional tracking loops may have variable signal 
integration lengths (in samples) which depend on Doppler 
shifts. In the case study SDR, the tracking loop maintains a 
constant length of 1023 chips, using a pre-integration of 
samples within one chip, to address Doppler shifts, e.g., one 
may have 4 or 5 samples per chip at a sampling rate of 5 MHz 
depending on the Doppler effect. Initially, the tracking loop 
collects a fixed size block of data corresponding to 1 ms. Thus, 
the locally-generated carrier is also sampled at 5 MHz, which is 
equivalent to approximately 5000 samples per epoch, again 
including Doppler effects. When the carrier is wiped off, the 
samples should be pre-integrated within each chip, thus, ending 
with an array of 1023N  chips. For the group-weighting 
method, the array is up-sampled to 𝑁 = 1024 so the size is a 
power-of-two, and the chips can be grouped using g , as will be 
seen in Section V-C. 
After chip pre-integration and up-sampling, the received 
vector, kr , is mixed with aligned in-prompt code replica, 
0
ks , 
for code alignment. The next step involves a partial integrate 
and dump block, which integrates a sequence of chips into M  
partial correlation groups, outputting the 1 M  kc  vector as 
seen in Fig. 4. 
The ckR  accum. block collects the kc  vector for statistical 
matrix estimation on every 1-ms epoch. Once the 
autocorrelation matrix, ckR , has collected enough epoch-
vectors, thus, reaching a suitable statistical significance, the 
MMSE solution can be linearly computed using (12) for the 
optimal group-weighting solution. This is done at the MMSE 
algorithm block. Once the matrix is suitable for inversion, it 
computes the solution on every epoch iteration. This block then 
outputs optimal kw  coefficients needed for interference 
filtering based on potential cross-correlation interference 
patterns seen in the partial autocorrelation matrix, ckR . The 
kw  coefficients are of size M , so they are matched to the 
received signal partial correlation vector, kc , for corrections. 
Other inputs to the MMSE block are group size, g, and channel 
signal power, kp , the latter of which is estimated continuously 
on conventional tracking loops. 
Last, another complete integrate and dump block is used to 
integrate the result k kw c  for an optimal bit-sample MMSE 
correlator output. Since IP channel is used, this output 
corresponds to navigation data. 
As mentioned, three pre-integration steps are involved in the 
modified MMSE correlator: (1) chip pre-integration from 
samples to chips, (2) partial integration from N  to M , based 
on the grouping parameter g , and (3) complete integration from 
M  to 1 for the navigation bit-sample. The first two integrations 
are done in one step at the partial integrate and dump block 
shown in Fig. 4 for reduced complexity implementation. Also, 
when comparing said modifications to a conventional GPS 
correlator, the MMSE correlator can be seen as a single unit 
replacing classical GPS blocks. Additionally, this unit can be 
implemented either as a replacement to a conventional 
correlator or as an additional unit in the receiver. 
B. Recursive autocorrelation matrix computation 
The implementation of the ckR  accum. block seen in Fig. 4 
is achieved by a recursive statistical method with attainable 
computational complexity for the current SDR testbed. Fig. 5 
shows a detailed implementation of the ckR accum. block. 
Consider a sequence of partial correlation vectors
  Llk tlt ,...,1, c , that are used to estimate autocorrelation 
matrix 
kc
R , given as: 
      
1
1 L T
ck L k l k l
l
t t t
L 
 R c c   (13) 
where lt  is the time instant of  lk tc  epoch-vector availability, 
and L  is the window size, which is fixed during receiver 
initialization. To address complexity constraints for the case 
study SDR implementation, the autocorrelation matrix ckR , 
seen in (12), is computed recursively in a sliding window 
manner by discarding the oldest  lk tc  entry and adding the 
newest one as follows: 
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Fig. 4.  A single MMSE correlator implementation in SDR tracking loop 
after carrier wipe-off coming from the IP channel [68]. 
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This recursively computed matrix is based on a sliding 
window technique explained as follows. The ckR  accum. block 
seen in Fig. 4 receives as input vectors of partial correlations, 
kc , of length 𝑀 which are fed into a first-input first-output 
(FIFO) vector buffer of size L  vectors, and M L  samples. 
On each epoch, a new input vector of partial correlations, 
 k newtc , is received for a channel k , which is fed into the 
FIFO vector buffer. At the same time, the oldest value on the 
FIFO vector buffer is pushed out, thus keeping the buffer at a 
fixed window size, L . At the same time, the input vector of 
partial correlations,  k newtc , is multiplied by its transpose to 
generate a matrix of size M M  to be added to the ckR  
accumulator seen in Fig. 5. Similarly, the oldest output vector 
of the buffer,  k oldtc , is similarly subtracted from ckR  and 
then discarded. These additions and subtraction on the ckR  
accum. block occur continuously on every 1-ms integration 
epoch, as per (14), until the FIFO vector buffer is full. This 
signifies a statistically sound autocorrelation matrix ckR . 
From the C/C++ implementation perspective, both the size 
of the FIFO vector buffer as well as the ckR  matrix become 
relevant in terms of memory usage. The FIFO vector buffer and 
the matrix size are determined by the grouping parameter g , 
the vector length M , and the sliding window size L . The FIFO 
vector buffer block and ckR  matrix are both implemented using 
dynamic memory allocation on variables that are initialized 
when called from the LV DLL call library function blocks. 
These memory allocations depend on initial user parameters, g
and L , prior to runtime execution and are not adjustable during 
runtime execution. To adjust them, the receiver would have to 
be stopped, reconfigured, and reinitialized. There are calibrated 
recommendations for the grouping size g  and sliding window 
L  pairs: g = 1, L = 1500; g = 2, L = 1000; g = 4, L = 1000; g = 
8, L = 1000; g = 16, L = 500; g = 32, L = 100; g = 64, L = 300. 
In this work, the configuration that achieves the best trade-off 
between computation complexity and performance is 64g 
and 300L  , which allocates a dynamic variable array of 4,800 
samples. Another recommended configuration pair, but slightly 
heavier in computation complexity is 64g   and 1200L  . 
This last pair consists of four times the window size for the 
same g  parameter and provides improved blind adaptation 
response, as the matrix becomes more robust and more sound 
in statistical terms, but at the cost of memory allocation. This 
configuration pair will be used as a case study in Section VII-
B. 
Since testing is done on navigation data mitigation abilities, 
a parallel MMSE correlator is used to bypass spoofing effects 
on synchronization loops. Therefore, this MMSE correlator unit 
is separated from nominal receiver operations to explore its 
instrumentation and mitigation capabilities at the correlator 
level and without disturbing common tracking operations and 
synchronization loops. 
C. Autocorrelation matrix numerical estimation 
The recursive autocorrelation matrix accumulated on every 
epoch is assumed to be full-rank and real valued. In realistic 
scenarios, however, it can be affected by numerical estimation 
errors and become ill-conditioned or singular. This paper 
follows [99], which applies a full-rank regularization technique 
based on eigenvalue spread. This regularization technique is a 
constrained minimum output energy estimator that substitutes 
1
ck

R  in (12) as follows: 
  
1
,CMOE k k ck MM Mgp 

 w R I 1   (15) 
where  is a positive-valued aid parameter that moderates 
eigenvalue spread in the autocorrelation matrix, which is 
common in multi-user detection. This approach was tailored for 
the MMSE correlator unit by fixing a calibrated value as the aid 
parameter for invertibility. This technique was implemented 
internally in the receiver and is used continuously for every 
epoch computation of the solution in (12). 
D. MMSE correlator block operations and numerical 
approach 
It is easy to surpass computational capacity when linear 
algebra floating-point operations are involved, especially if 
real-time operation is required. The operation count for the 
individual blocks on the MMSE correlator unit (see Fig. 4), 
including the recursive autocorrelation matrix accumulator (see 
Fig. 5) and the reduced complexity solution (12) computation, 
is presented in floating-point operations (FLOPs) [100] in Table 
V. Without the loss of generality, we consider 1024N   and a 
grouping parameter of 64g   with a window size of 300l  , 
which proves to be a feasible approach on the case study 
receiver. The resulting size of the matrix is 16 16M   . Table 
V shows an estimated count of FLOPs for each stage involved 
in the MMSE correlator unit. These operations are for every 1 
ms (epoch) of a bit-sample. For the first step, which involves 
interference injection, up to three interferers can be configured, 
each one accounting for N  FLOPs. These interferers inject 
chip sequences of size N with cross-correlation jamming 
effects. More on interference injection is discussed in Section 
Fig. 5.  Sliding window technique for recursive autocorrelation matrix 
computation and FIFO vector machine. 
    
  
… … 
FIFO vector buffer (size ) 
  
    
 
  
  
 
    
   
  
     
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INSTRUMENTATION AND MEASUREMENT (ACCEPTED) 
VII-A. The partial correlations stage involves reducing the 
received signal vector ( N M ). The matrix accumulation 
(see Fig. 5) can be seen of order  2O M . The MMSE solution 
in (12) is an estimated approach on FLOPs since it contains a 
matrix inverse operation that requires to be computed on every 
epoch iteration. This stage accounts for the most operations as 
it is of order  3O M . 
E. MMSE unit integration budget 
Similar to conventional GPS computational complexity 
budget operations listed in Section IV, this section provides a 
budget including case study mitigation operations to assess 
complexity load. It also discretizes common real-time 
operations as individual units for comparison. 
Tracking correlators and discriminators are commonly 
implemented in HW for faster operation since they are updating 
their discriminators and integrators on every given epoch (1 
ms). Other advanced correlators have longer integration times, 
e.g., 10-20 ms, but are considered for advanced receivers. Thus, 
this 1 ms measurement becomes the threshold for real-time 
operation in SW. Therefore, all relevant computations 
occurring at each epoch including carrier and code generators, 
correlators, and tracking discriminators, should be computed in 
less than 1 ms for the SW receiver to be considered real-time. 
If this ensemble of conventional GPS computations can be 
processed in less than 1 ms of integration time, it leaves 
additional computational resources for aggregate operations, 
such as interference injection and mitigation algorithms similar 
to those seen in Table V. 
Conventional tracking and MMSE correlator unit operations 
from Table V can be seen in Table VI as a real-time 
computational budget benchmarked from the case study 
receiver in mitigation mode. This computational budget relates 
all operation benchmarks to 1 ms, which represents 100% of the 
shared computations for the time period cycle. 
SIMD-based correlators for carrier and code are shown for a 
single epoch using 1 ms integration time. For code correlation, 
a single unit benchmark is shown, i.e., IP correlator, as opposed 
to six correlators [58]. This encompasses code generation, wipe 
off, and integration. If the full nominal operation of a single 
GPS channel would be assessed, then 6 correlator values and a 
carrier value would need to be accounted for. Moreover, if 12 
GPS channels are assumed to be tracked, then this number 
would be scaled properly. Tracking discriminator computations 
are also shown, which comprises feedback updates from 
tracking loops as discussed in Section IV. For interference 
injection, a SIMD jammer benchmark was added per correlator 
channel, representing a single interferer’s computational 
expense. The pre-integrator of vector kc  is measured per 
correlator channel, and integrates from samples to pre-
integrations, e.g., 5000 to 16, as mentioned in Section VI-A. 
The accumulation on ckR , as seen in Table V, represents the 
full computation seen in equation (14) for a single correlator 
channel. The MMSE solution in (12) was similarly evaluated 
for a single correlator channel. Finally, the full integration of 
optimized coefficients with grouping vector kc  for the 
navigation bit-sample is measured. 
Table VI shows case study receiver tracking operations. It 
can be seen that a single GPS channel accounts for roughly 
~1.9% of the total computational budget. Since the receiver can 
run up to 12 channels, this would be scaled to ~22.4%, thus, 
leaving more than 70% of the computational budget in 
conventional mode. Additionally, previous testing on case 
study SDR showed the LV environment would provide an 
additional overhead of approximately ~3%, which covers the 
FE interface and communication, and data acquisition among 
other common operations [46]. This ~3% is included in the total 
budget computations to approximate live capabilities of the 
receiver in conventional mode. 
Alternatively, a single channel being jammed with one 
interferer and mitigated spends roughly ~8.8%, a 6.9% rise 
from the non-mitigation mode. Therefore, full implementation 
of the conventional operation, jamming, and mitigation mode 
on 12 live channels reaches the 100% threshold for real-time 
operation. This shows a 5 times surge in computational 
complexity in the case study receiver when in mitigation mode 
for the same common configuration. For additional comparison 
purposes, the SDR was able to achieve a maximum of 8 
channels at 10 MHz sampling rate, with similar full 
implementation in mitigation mode, when contrasting a 
maximum configuration of 25 MHz sampling rate with 12 live 
TABLE V  
OPERATION COUNT (FLOPS) FOR SEVERAL STAGES ON MMSE 
CORRELATOR ON EVERY EPOCH 
 
Stage Operation Count (FLOPs) 
Interference Injection
ki   N  
Partial integrate and dump 
 N M   1M g 
 
Old Tk kc c  
2M   
New Tk kc c  
2M   
Accumulate 
ckR  
23M   
Compute (12) solution 2 32M M M    
Integrate bit-sample Tk kc w  2M  
 
TABLE VI 
REAL-TIME COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY BUDGET IN TIME CYCLE OF 1 
MS EPOCH 
 
Operation type Scope 
(corr or 
chan**) 
Cycle 
time 
(ns) 
Share of 
computational 
time* (%) 
SIMD carrier generation 
and wipe-off 
chan 8,500.8 0.85% 
SIMD code generation, 
wipe-off, and integration 
corr 1,655.7 0.17% 
Tracking discriminators chan 200.0 0.02% 
SIMD jamming injection corr 5,263.8 0.53% 
MMSE pre-integrator 
block kc *** 
corr 28,683.8 2.87% 
Accumulate ckR  (14) 
corr 26,348.0 2.63% 
MMSE solution (12) corr 8,502.2 0.85% 
Integrate bit 
T
k kc w   
corr 78.8 0.01% 
*Computing time period cycle of 100% is equivalent to 1,000,000 nsec or 1 ms. 
**Scope of the operation is either corr (correlator channel) or chan (full GPS channel). 
**Pre-integrator modifies received kr  vector of size, e.g., 5,000 samples at 5 MHz, to kc  
vector of size 16. 
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channels in non-mitigation mode. These comparisons 
demonstrate a computational surge even for a fully optimized 
mitigation algorithm (see Section V) [68]. The next section 
assesses the performance of the algorithm filtering capabilities 
in terms of bit-error rate (BER) for a single channel when 
interference is added to real GPS signals. 
VII. SIMULATION RESULTS 
In this work, specific interference is used to represent an 
idealized perfectly synchronized GPS-like spoofer with 
malicious intentions that affect cross-correlation of despreading 
codes. The case study method does not specifically detect the 
interference but adjusts when such phenomena are observed 
(blind estimator). The interference injected mimics a worst-case 
cross-correlation scenario. 
The interference injection occurs right before the code wipe 
off and after the carrier wipe off; therefore, the interference 
signal does not contain Doppler effects. This is assumed to be 
the worst-case scenario for an attack since a spoofer would have 
fully modulated power to the intended in-phase channel. This 
creates the most damage, thus, can be used as a reference 
scenario. This approach makes the receiver immune to GPS-
like synchronized intervention. 
The case study SDR with interference injection and 
mitigation is evaluated by using a hybrid approach of real 
signals coming from a LabVIEW-based NI GPS simulation 
toolkit [101] and internally generated synthetic interference. 
The method in [12] addresses a type of spoofer that can generate 
an exact same but time-shifted signal per channel using worst-
case scenario delays, which have the greatest effect. Since code 
delays and Doppler shifts are known in the interference 
injection, a potential spoofer can use it to its advantage by 
filtering signals into the channel via cross-correlation 
interference. 
Specifically, interference injection occurs by replicating the 
k-th channel code replica, 
0
ks , and delaying it a known number 
of chips. The delayed code replica, k

s (where   is a delay in 
chips), is based on known cross-correlation properties of the 
PRN sequence for satellite k , thus, spoofing the modulated 
navigation bits coming from GPS satellites. The spoofing 
power amplifies when at the higher sidelobes of the gold code 
cross-correlation. This causes the correlation to lose 
orthogonality [102]. Therefore, the most efficient spoofing can 
occur at these sidelobes with delay  . 
The interferer navigation bits are modulated onto the 
spoofing signal by assigning random bit polarity every 20 bit-
samples. The authentic and spoofed navigation bits are not 
necessarily synchronized in terms of bit edges since the 
spoofing bits can be injected at any time. 
As mentioned in Section VI-E, the case study receiver can 
successfully jam up to 12 live channels. The grouping 
parameter was set to 64g   with a window size of 300l  . As 
an aggregate experiment, we also tested 64g   and 1200l  , 
which is four times the window size of previous parameters as 
discussed in Section VI-B. 
A. Performance results 
In this subsection, we assess previous work [12] in a case 
study receiver for algorithm functionality and real-time 
operation [68] per channel for pre-PVT mitigation. Without the 
loss of generality, we simulate interference power relative to 
signal power in dB scale. Interference-to-signal ratio (ISR) 
noise power can be neglected when compared to the sum of the 
interference and signal powers after channel synchronization 
and integration. 
We assess testing scenarios for matched filter (MF) 
correlators [58], and the case study MMSE correlator for a 
single channel. BER vs. ISR performance curves are plotted and 
evaluated. This is done to study the cleaning capabilities of the 
algorithm in the presence of strong interference, compared to a 
MF correlator. Similarly, a worst-case scenario of three 
jamming signals per channel, where all three jammers match in 
chip and bit alignment as well, is included. 
Our goal is to obtain statistically significant BER 
performance results for functionality purposes in the chosen 
case study mitigation technique. Thus, we simulate 3 million 
navigation bits or 60 million bit-samples, corresponding to 
1,000 min of simulation. We perform the simulations with a 
200-second real signal file previously recorded from the NI 
GPS simulator [101]. The recorded file has strong GPS signals; 
thus, noise can be neglected as previously mentioned. We 
proceed to run the file 300 times to obtain our navigation bits 
quota while injecting interference bits with relative power 
levels from reported SNR from target channel, and random bit 
polarity. This is all done on the in-house LV-based SDR [53], 
[54], which was prototyped for this test as in [68]. 
A well-known cross-correlation immunity of around 26 dB is 
present in MF correlators based on GPS system design [1]. 
Nevertheless, after or around this ISR level (26 dB) the channel 
is completely corrupted. Fig. 6 shows the performance curve for 
one and three interfering signals, where BER has been assessed 
for 20 bit-samples corresponding to a full navigation bit. The 
curve compares the performance of MF vs. MMSE correlators. 
It also compares a MMSE correlator with 4 times the proposed 
window length discussed in Section VI-B. The comparison 
approach assesses the BER performance at a 30 dB ISR level 
(see vertical dashed line), which is well above the 
aforementioned 26-dB immunity level. This 30 dB ISR level 
would notably corrupt the GPS channel as it can be clearly seen 
for the cases of MF (1) and MF (3), corresponding to MF with 
1 interferer, and MF with 3 interferers present, respectively. For 
both these cases, the channel is corrupted with a BER of 50%. 
When comparing against the MMSE correlator, we can see 
MMSE (1) shows a BER gain of almost 105 against MF (1), for 
1 interferer. For MMSE (3), a BER gain of around 101.5 can be 
seen against MF (3), for 3 interferers. Finally, when increasing 
the window size four times used in MMSE (3), i.e., using MMSE 
4x (3), a BER gain of around 105 is seen against MF (3), similar 
to the gain seen in MMSE (1) vs. MF (1), but for 3 interferers. 
Table VII summarizes these BER performance results at the 30 
dB ISR observation dashed line (see Fig. 6). 
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
This paper provides an overall review and categorization of 
reported GNSS-SDR receivers for conventional and spoofing 
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domains, in terms of reported instrumentation. Many 
conventional SDRs are not able to support mitigation modes in 
real-time, which necessitates separate categorization of 
spoofing mitigation receivers. A case study demonstration of a 
significant surge in complexity from a conventional to a 
mitigation receiver is presented. This is done through 
computational budgeting of an SDR receiver employing a 
modified MMSE algorithm from [12] optimized for real-time 
operation [68] in a LV-based receiver [53], [54]. The expanded 
version of [68] is presented, where the (pre-PVT) mitigation is 
accomplished through a blind equalizer processing. The 
approach was validated and assessed using BER performance 
curves, as [12] did not demonstrate operation with real signals 
and in real-time. It is selected due to demanding computational 
complexity. To analyze said complexity increase the paper 
tabulates a breakdown of common algorithmic operations for 
conventional and mitigation mode of the case study receiver. A 
surge of the computational load from 20% to 100% (5 times) of 
the case study receiver was seen when in mitigation mode as 
compared to conventional operation. A common configuration 
of 5 MHz sampling rate, int8 I-Q interleaved samples, and 12 
live channels were used. It should be mentioned that the MMSE 
correlator unit could potentially be incorporated in lieu of any 
of the conventional correlators. 
The case study employed an idealized spoofer perfectly 
synchronized in both carrier frequency and phase with the 
authentic signal, which allowed to concentrate on 
computational budgeting aspects and not on spoofing-specific 
effects. At the same time, the selected idealized environment 
can simulate worst-case scenarios as a baseline. Authors 
currently address spoofing mitigation aspects more 
comprehensively including sophisticated advancements of [12], 
[68], which will be presented in the future dedicated work. This 
projected work will align various methods with state-of-the-art 
spoofing mitigation techniques and test with representative 
signals such as TEXBAT [78]. 
In summary, when tightly integrating interference mitigation 
algorithms, especially in real-time manner, the complexity 
surge truly differentiates this class of GNSS-SDR receivers. 
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RECEIVER BER PERFORMANCE FOR SPECIFIED TARGET ISR= 30 DB TO 
ASSESS GAINS AFTER GPS IMMUNITY LEVELS 
 
 MF (1) MMSE 
(1) 
MF (3) MMSE 
(3) 
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4x (3) 
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